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How COOL is U.S. Shrimp trade? 
Abstract 
We investigate the economic impact of partial implementation of COOL on U.S. shrimp 
trade by developing a conceptual model that encompasses horizontal and vertical product 
differentiation. Horizontal differentiation is characterized by explicitly accounting for 
differences in shrimp processing – fresh or frozen versus peeled, canned, or breaded. Ver-
tical differentiation in the conceptual model is captured by two scenarios – presence and 
absence of COOL – on trade between major shrimp exporters and United States. COOL 
implementation results in quality disclosure through origin labeling and additional costs 
of labeling on fresh and frozen shrimp sold at retail while processed shrimp products are 
excluded from labeling. The conceptual model indicates a change in product mix with 
COOL implementation: the relative share of processed shrimp increases when compared 
to unprocessed shrimp. Empirically testing the hypothesis using an econometric model 
shows there is no change in the product mix in the two scenarios. The results however 
change depending on the choice of variable used to proxy quality. 
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Introduction 
Globalization of markets and increased economic integration of agricultural and 
food systems have become possible with developments in transportation, communication, 
and information technologies, along with policy reforms. With increased international 
food trade, the food supply chain from producers to consumers increasingly transcends 
international borders. The consequence of the increase in transnational trade is that coun-
tries share the responsibility for food safety, as globalization of the food supply could in-
troduce new food safety risks, revive previously controlled risks, and spread contaminat-
ed food more widely (Buzby and Unnevehr, 2003).  
One of the means to proxy food safety that is attracting attention in the in-
ternational trade arena is identity preservation. Under an identity preservation system, 
information about the origin of food follows from harvest all the way to the consumer. 
Country of origin labeling (COOL) aims to preserve identity on country of origin and 
convey this information to consumers. This identity preservation system could be helpful 
to authorities in the control of foodborne illness but is not a complete solution to the food 
safety problem. Mandatory COOL (MCOOL) was implemented in United States on 
seafood in the retail market in April 2005. However, processed seafood (breaded, canned, 
cooked) does not require labeling.   With more than 70 percent of seafood consumed in 1
!  COOL policy has exemptions and exclusions. “Processed” seafood is excluded leaving more than 50 percent of 1
seafood sold in the United States without labels; 90 percent of fish sellers, such as wholesale markets and restaurants 
which are classified under “Foodservice”, are also exempt (www.foodandwaterwatch.org).
the United States being imported, the exclusion of processed seafood could redefine the 
nature of trade between major exporters and the United States. 
U.S. Imported Shrimp Market 
Shrimp products make up the largest single import item among fish products and 
are expected to continue to be the most popular seafood consumed in the United States 
(Haby 2003; Kuchler, Krissoff, and Harvey 2010). Most of the shrimp imported to the 
United States are from developing countries from Southeast Asia. For the foreseeable fu-
ture, shrimp will continue to be produced primarily by developing nations and dominate 
seafood trade moving from developing to developed nations (Haby, 2003). However, 
many less developed countries have a history of raising food safety issues as they have 
difficulty meeting developed countries’ quality and safety standards due to lack of suffi-
cient funds to invest in quality control measures, more adequately trained staff, and pur-
chase expensive equipment (Rahman, 2001). Chinese seafood products have been primar-
ily in the news for testing positive for traces of antibiotic residues or other contaminants 
(Allshouse et al. 2003; Lumpkin 2007; Acheson 2007; Gale and Buzby 2009). In addi-
tion, it is widely reported that U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may have lower 
food safety oversight of imported seafood, which lays the emphasis on consumer judg-
m e n t s w h e n c o n s u m i n g s h r i m p , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e i m p o r t e d 
(www.foodandwaterwatch.org). The analysis of FDA refusals of imported seafood ship-
ments from 2003 to 2006 revealed that of the imports refused, more than 65 percent were 
processed seafood products, which are excluded from country of origin labeling require-
ments that the U.S. Department of Agriculture oversees. 
Shrimp is produced from practically every tropical and subtropical coastal country 
in the world. Historically, the source of supply has been wild harvests from the world-
wide band of nearshore tropical waters. However, with many wild sources being harvest-
ed close to their maximum sustainable levels, new supplies have come from coastal 
shrimp farms. Most are located in developing countries within Southeast Asia, the Indian 
subcontinent, and Central America (Haby 2003; Kuchler, Krissoff, and Harvey 2010). In 
2011, 91 percent of total shrimp imports were supplied to the United States by just eight 
countries. Exports to the United States are becoming more geographically concentrated, 
even among the top eight countries, with exports from Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, India, and China accounting for 73 percent of total imports in 2011. The main 
six providers (Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, India, Ecuador and China) in 2011 account-
ed for 81 percent of the imported volume and value (NMFS Website). 
Previous research pointed out the role of imported shrimp in the impressive 
growth of the U.S. shrimp market. In 2011, the share of imported shrimp in the U.S. mar-
ket reached 93 percent up from just 62 percent twenty five years earlier (www.globe-
fish.org; NMFS Website). According to Haby et al. (2002) the important factors that 
could have contributed to the U.S. shrimp import growth include growing worldwide 
supplies of farm-raised shrimp, stagnant growth in Japanese consumption, higher tariffs 
in the European Union (E.U.) for some Asian shrimp, a zero-tolerance policy for residues 
of banned antibiotics in farmed shrimp entering the E.U., the zero tariffs imposed on 
shrimp products in the United States, the appreciation of the U.S. dollar, and the expan-
sion of the economy in the 1990s. Some of these factors led to a decrease in shrimp prices 
in the United States and encouraged consumption of shrimp. The strong growth in shrimp 
consumption has resulted in the United States overtaking Japan as the top shrimp market 
in the world. 
The product forms of shrimp that enter the United States span the continuum of 
convenience from raw, frozen, shell-on, headless product to hand peeled, cooked, bread-
ed, and canned shrimp. Haby (2003) report that in the eleven years from 1990 to 2001, 
exporters of farm-raised shrimp went from exporting roughly two-thirds of total produc-
tion in the shell-on, headless market form to converting a significant fraction of their an-
nual harvests into value-added products like hand-peeled raw and cooked product. In 
2011 although frozen shell-on shrimp was still the most imported product, products with 
more value added, such as peeled frozen shrimp, breaded frozen shrimp, and other frozen 
preparations (a category that includes cooked shrimp and meals prepared with shrimp, 
among other products), have remarkably increased their share of imports. Nearly all of 
the increase in shrimp imports has occurred within two categories: (a) raw, peeled prod-
uct and (b) cooked, peeled preparations. According to the U.S. country-of-origin labeling 
law, category (a) is required to be labeled while (b) is not.   2
 With MCOOL implementation, an exporting country may export more processed 
than unprocessed shrimp, thus circumventing the compliance costs associated with 
!  Kuchler, Krissoff, and Harvey (2010) mention domestic shrimp is largely consumed through foodservice, where 2
there is no legal requirement to inform consumers of the origin of shrimp, and imported shrimp is largely consumed 
in retail, where COOL or the Tariff Act require identifying country of origin.
MCOOL and preventing quality disclosure. Exporters may easily change the product mix 
for many reasons. First, several of the top ten countries (e.g., Thailand, Vietnam, and In-
donesia) have a growing, dependable supply of raw materials (Haby, 2003). Second, con-
venience can be added to this dependable supply at a relatively low cost because wage 
rates in most shrimp-exporting countries are much lower than those in the United States. 
Third, shrimp can be grown to a predetermined count size that meshes with menu re-
quirements and advertising plans. Haby (2003) outlines other institutional considerations 
that create national demand/supply imbalances that in turn can explain the nature of the 
shrimp trade including tariffs, currency exchange rates, and enforcement of food safety 
regulations.  
The objective of this work is to address the economic impact of partial MCOOL 
implementation on the shrimp trade between United States and the major shrimp export-
ing countries. The spectrum of shrimp products exported to United States is generally 
consolidated into two primary forms. These include unprocessed shrimp (raw, peeled, 
frozen, and shell-on) and processed shrimp (cooked, peeled, canned, and breaded).  First, 
with a conceptual model we determine the factors that explain the change in the product 
export mix with MCOOL implementation, from unprocessed into processed shrimp. 
Then, we empirically test the diversion hypothesis using an econometric model that ac-
counts for the share of unprocessed shrimp over total shrimp imports as the dependent 
variable. The independent variables are based on the reduced-form expression of the con-
ceptual model.  
Kuchler, Krissoff, and Harvey (2010) use data from a nationally representative 
panel of households that record retail food purchases, and estimate consumer demand for 
shrimp with the implementation of COOL. They aggregate shrimp into three distinct 
products- random-weight shrimp (unprocessed and not pre-packaged), frozen bagged 
shrimp (unprocessed or partially processed), and frozen bagged and breaded shrimp (pro-
cessed). They expected demand for random-weight shrimp to be most affected by COOL, 
however their results suggest consumers did not respond to the new country-of-origin la-
bels on shrimp. Our work is distinct with the focus on exploring effect of partial COOL in 
diversion of unprocessed shrimp to processed shrimp form for major shrimp exporters. 
Conceptual Model  
Horizontal (Hotelling, 1929) and vertical differentiation (e.g., Mussa and Rosen, 
1978) often focuses on a single characteristic of a product. However, most products em-
body both horizontal and vertical characteristics. We consider shrimp to be sold in two 
varieties – unprocessed and processed (horizontal characteristic), and differentiable with 
respect to origin, where origin is indicative of quality (vertical characteristic). We assume 
as in Lusk et al. (2006), that country of origin is often associated with product quality. 
The two varieties of shrimp sold, i.e., unprocessed and processed, are indexed by u and p 
respectively. Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) state that consumer utility function 
can be assumed to be additive in the two characteristics. The simplest way of combining 
these two types of characteristics is by the following conditional indirect utility for con-
sumer buying shrimp variety i from country j: 
(1) !   
where y is income, !  is the price of shrimp variety i, !  is quality associated with 
shrimp from country j, a consumer type is described by his or her marginal willingness to 
pay !  for the vertical characteristic and his or her ideal location !  with respect to the hor-
izontal characteristic. A variety specification is a pair ! . The utility is additive in 
the two characteristics. This assumption means that the two dimensions of the character-
istics space are independent and can be properly identified. 
Horizontal differentiation set-up is described in more details in what follows. 
Consumers reside on a linear street with a length of ! > 0. Consumers are uniformly dis-
tributed on this interval, so at each point lies a single consumer. Hence the total number 
of consumers in the economy is L. Each consumer is indexed by ! , where x is the 
location of the consumer measured as the distance from the origin. Unprocessed shrimp is 
located u units of distance from point 0 ! . Processed shrimp is located to the right 
of u, !  units of distance from point L ! . Thus, distance from origin can be 
interpreted as the degree of processing. Based on horizontal differentiation, consumers 
are assumed to gravitate towards the shrimp product with the lowest “delivered” price, 
i.e., the price of the product ( ! ) plus the transportation cost to the location of the con-
sumer ! . Transportation cost is the monetary loss equivalent to a consumer who 
desires !  degree of processing but has to purchase shrimp with a different degree of pro-
cessing.  
 We consider two scenarios – pre-MCOOL and post-MCOOL implementation to 
capture the market effects on consumers and shrimp exporting countries. In the pre-
MCOOL scenario it is assumed that consumers cannot differentiate with respect to the 
vertical characteristic as shrimp products are not required to have mandatory labels indi-
cating origin. However, consumers are assumed to differ in their preferences regarding 
the variety of shrimp consumed, i.e., processed versus unprocessed shrimp. In the post-
MCOOL scenario we assume that consumers can differentiate origin of shrimp with la-
bels only for the unprocessed shrimp category. Processed shrimp is excluded from label-
ing under the country-of-origin labeling law. Firms in a country exporting unprocessed 
and processed shrimp in this scenario have to bear compliance costs associated with 
MCOOL if they are producing unprocessed shrimp.  
 The U.S. shrimp market comprises of imported shrimp and negligible domestic 
shrimp. In 2011 imported shrimp accounted for 93 percent of the demand, with local pro-
duction only able to meet 7 percent of that demand (NMFS Website). Moreover, imported 
shrimp is available from worldwide producing regions around the year unlike U.S. 
shrimp production which is seasonal. Due to negligible domestic shrimp production, we 
assume the U.S. shrimp market is exclusively supplied with imported shrimp. Because 
developing countries have difficulty meeting developed countries’ quality and safety 
standards, the quality or perceived quality of shrimp from developing countries is as-
sumed to be lower than the quality of shrimp produced in the United States. In the ab-
sence of MCOOL, when U.S. consumers are unable to ascertain the origin of shrimp, we 
assume that consumers form an expectation of shrimp quality. In forming this expecta-
tion, we assume that consumer factor in U.S. shrimp quality even though the actual sup-
ply of U.S. shrimp is small. Thus, the expected quality of shrimp without MCOOL may 
be higher than the quality of shrimp from importing countries.  
The utility function and the firm’s profit-maximization condition of exporting 
country for the two scenarios – Pre- and Post-MCOOL implementation are set up as fol-
lows. 
Pre-COOL implementation 
Origin is not identified in this scenario. The quality of shrimp is perceived to be 
average quality ! .  
 The conditional indirect utility function is defined as: 
(2) !  
where !  and !   are the price in U.S. dollars consumers in the United States pay to con-
sume shrimp variety u and p respectively. This set-up assumes a covered market, i.e., all 
consumers buy either unprocessed or processed shrimp and no consumer buys nothing. A 
market is covered when the transportation cost (or the disutility from consuming a variety 
that is less than ideal), ! , is small enough. Figure 1 is a schematic representation of a 
covered and uncovered market. The market is covered to the left when t ≤ t”, i.e., all con-
sumers who prefer a low level of processing purchase the unprocessed shrimp. The mar-
ket is uncovered to the left when t > t”, such as t = t’. In other words, some consumers 
who prefer a low level of processing do not purchase the unprocessed shrimp. In this 
case, ! . Similarly, the market is covered to the right when t ≤ t**, and the 
market is uncovered to the right when t > t**, such as t = t**. In this case, 
! . Thus, in making the assumption that the market is covered we assume 
that t ≤ min[t”, t**].  
We assume a covered market because the derived expressions of equilibrium price 
and quantity become unmanageable with an uncovered market. Thereby making further 
analysis based on these expressions difficult to infer and conclude.  
Let !  denote the consumer who is indifferent between purchasing u or p. Formal-
ly, because ! , then at ! , !  Consumer de-
mand can then be written as: 
(3) !  
where !  and !  are demand for unprocessed and processed shrimp respectively.  
Firms in each exporting country maximize profit of selling unprocessed or pro-
cessed shrimp to the United States by choosing the price in local currency. However, U.S. 
demand is based on the landed price in U.S. dollars. Therefore, the demand is affected by 
exchange rates and ocean freight rates. Moreover, most exporting countries may also 
need to pay an import duty or tariffs. Thus, the landed price of shrimp in U.S. dollars can 
be written as: 
(4) !  
where, e is the exchange rate (local currency per U.S. dollar), !  is the price of exported 
shrimp variety in local currency, !  is the gross tariff rate (1 + the ad valorem tariff rate), 
and !  is the ocean freight rate to the United States in U.S. dollars.  
Each exporting country is assumed to have one firm producing unprocessed 
shrimp and one firm producing processed shrimp.   The firms compete in prices (Bertrand 3
Competition) for the U.S. shrimp market. The profit-maximizing problem of firm i (i = u, 
p) is expressed as: 
(5) !  
where !  is the marginal cost of producing unprocessed or processed shrimp in the ex-
porter’s currency, all other variables are as defined above. After substituting (3) and (4) in 
(5) we take the first derivative with respect to !  and solve for equilibrium prices and 
quantities. The expressions for equilibrium quantity of unprocessed and processed shrimp 
are given as: 
(6)  !  
!  Under a covered market, when one firm produces both processed and unprocessed shrimp, it is not possible to ob3 -
serve the effect of price on market share because the change in demand for one product is exactly offset by the 
change in demand for the other product. To solve the problem, we assume two firms in a country, one producing 
processed and the other unprocessed shrimp. The implication is that substitution occurs at the country level with 
market forces dictating substitution between the products.
The superscript BC indicates equilibrium quantity in the pre-COOL scenario.  
We are interested in the share of unprocessed shrimp over the total shrimp export-
ed by a country to United States because MCOOL implementation on unprocessed 
shrimp may result in a change in the exporting country’s product mix. With MCOOL im-
plementation firms producing unprocessed shrimp incur additional costs associated with 
labeling and quality disclosure, so market forces (change in costs and demand) may lead 
the exporting country to substitute unprocessed shrimp with processed shrimp. The share 
of unprocessed shrimp pre-COOL can be considered as a benchmark when evaluating the 
effects of MCOOL implementation. It is given by: 
(7) !  
The share of unprocessed shrimp decreases with increase in transportation costs, 
marginal costs of production, and duties levied on unprocessed shrimp. All these costs are 
levied per unit of volume. Inversely, increase in costs associated with processed shrimp 
affect positively the share of unprocessed shrimp. 
Post-COOL implementation 
With MCOOL implementation, exporters must inform consumers of the origin of 
unprocessed shrimp. Additional costs associated with labeling, i.e., compliance costs are 
incurred by firms selling unprocessed shrimp and these costs are represented by z and are 
measured in local currency. When consumers are able to identify the origin of unpro-
cessed shrimp, the quality perception of unprocessed shrimp is based on the country of 
origin, represented by ! . However, for processed shrimp, which does not require label-
ing, perceived quality is the average quality ! . The utility function and profit maximiza-
tion function in this scenario are defined as follows: 
(8) !  
where z = 0 for the firm producing processed shrimp, i.e., when i = p. Equilibrium prices 
and quantities are derived similar to the pre-MCOOL scenario. Equilibrium quantities of 
unprocessed and processed shrimp are as follows: 
(9) !  
The share of unprocessed shrimp over total shrimp exported with MCOOL implementa-
tion is given as: 
(10) !  
As in the pre-MCOOL scenario, per unit of volume costs such as transportation 
costs, marginal costs of production, compliance cost, and duties levied associated with 
unprocessed shrimp reduces the share of unprocessed shrimp, while costs associated with 
processed shrimp affect the share positively. With MCOOL implementation, two new 
terms are introduced that affect the share of unprocessed shrimp negatively. They are 
consumers’ valuation for quality and quality itself, and compliance costs. If !  the 
lower is the quality of unprocessed shrimp, the lower is the share of unprocessed shrimp. 
However, if the quality of unprocessed shrimp is greater than the perceived quality of 
non-labeled shrimp, then the greater is the quality of unprocessed shrimp, the greater is 
the share of unprocessed shrimp. These effects are magnified by the extent to which con-
sumers value quality, i.e., by the size of ! . 
Analysis 
Given the conceptual model, we are interested in analyzing the change in the 
product mix of shrimp exported to the United States after MCOOL was implemented. 
Following are the results of interest: 
(11) !  
(12) !  
(13)  !  
where !  represents the change in the share of unprocessed shrimp with MCOOL 
implementation. 
Equation (11) shows that the share of unprocessed shrimp is smaller after 
MCOOL implementation, indicating that exporting countries change their product mix 
toward greater quantities of processed shrimp (non-labeled) with MCOOL if ! . 
The size of the change in product mix is influenced by the extent to which a) consumers 
value quality ( ! ), b) the perceived quality of the unprocessed shrimp exported by that 
country ( ! ) relative to the perceived quality of non-labeled shrimp sold in the United 
States (! ), c) the cost of compliance ( ! ) in U.S. dollars, weighted by the tariff on unpro-
cessed shrimp ( ! ), d) the consumers’ disutility from not consuming their ideal variety of 
shrimp ( ! ) multiplied by the size of the market ( ! ).  
The parameters of interest are difference in perceived quality of non-labeled 
shrimp and quality of labeled unprocessed shrimp, weighted by consumers’ value for 
quality, and costs of compliance. These two parameters are the best indicators to measure 
the effect of MCOOL implementation on the quantity of unprocessed shrimp exported to 
the United States.  
Increase in compliance costs results in decrease in the quantity of unprocessed 
and thus, labeled shrimp produced as shown in equation (12). The intuition behind this is 
that as compliance costs are associated with unprocessed shrimp alone, it becomes more 
expensive to produce unprocessed shrimp when MCOOL is implemented. 
Equation (13) shows an increase in the difference in quality between the quality of 
unprocessed shrimp attributed to the exporting country and the perceived average quality 
decreases/increases the share of unprocessed shrimp based on the difference in quality 
being positive/negative. The intuition is that if quality of unprocessed shrimp of an ex-
porting country is lower/higher than the perceived average quality, the share of unpro-
cessed shrimp decreases/increases as consumers are able to identify unprocessed shrimp 
through labels and consumer demand for it falls/rises. Exporting country would simply 
respond to market forces and export more/less processed shrimp to circumvent/allow dis-
closure of quality via origin labels. 
In summary, in this section we demonstrated that MCOOL implementation can 
result in changing product mix of exported shrimp, i.e., in the transformation of unpro-
cessed shrimp into processed shrimp. To test this hypothesis we develop an empirical 
model in the next section. 
Empirical Implementation 
The variables affecting the nature of bilateral shrimp trade between major shrimp 
exporting countries and United States are largely based on the expressions for the share 
of unprocessed shrimp in total shrimp exports from a country before and after the imple-
mentation of MCOOL (equations 7 and 10). The objective of the econometric model is to 
test the effect of MCOOL on the share of unprocessed shrimp from major shrimp export-
ing countries. Based on the conceptual model, consumers’ valuation of quality facilitated 
by MCOOL is an important variable that determines the nature of shrimp product mix. 
Assuming quality via origin is identifiable with MCOOL, which was implemented in 
April 2005, we examine the effect of MCOOL on the share of unprocessed shrimp 
through an interaction variable representing MCOOL implementation and relative quality 
of shrimp.  
The empirical model considers the top shrimp exporting countries to the United 
States. They are China, Ecuador, Indonesia, India, Mexico, Thailand, and Vietnam. The 
major shrimp producing regions can be broadly identified as Asia (China, Indonesia, In-
dia, Thailand, and Vietnam), Central America (Mexico), and South America (Ecuador). In 
2007, Asian countries were specialized in exporting processed shrimp (China – 78 per-
cent), while Central and South America supplied mainly unprocessed shrimp (Mexico – 
90 percent, and Ecuador – 99 percent). In 2007, U.S. imports mainly comprised of unpro-
cessed shrimp – nearly 74 percent of total imports (www.globefish.org). Thailand is the 
top shrimp supplier to the United States and its product mix is approximately divided 
equally between unprocessed and processed shrimp. The monthly time period extends 
from 1998 to 2008. The empirical model based on the reduced-form expressions of the 
conceptual model given by equations (7) and (10), is approximated linearly by the fol-
lowing regression equation: 
(14) !  
The definitions and descriptions of variables included in equation (14) for country 
j are as follows: 
RS = Monthly share of unprocessed shrimp quantity over total quantity. No units. Value 
lies between zero and one. 
EXC = Monthly real exchange rate index. No units. (2005=1) 
TRF = Anti-dumping duties imposed by United States on exporting countries – China, 
Thailand, India, Vietnam, and Ecuador for time period 2005 to 2008. Measured as 
percentage.   4
! Anti-dumping duties were imposed on selective countries for certain period of time for unprocessed shrimp. No 4
duties have been imposed on processed shrimp in the time period considered. 
FRT = Monthly transportation charges for shrimp of type i. It includes cost, insurance, 
and freight rate. Measured as value in dollars per kilogram. 
COOL = Dummy for Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling law. It is also representative 
of cost of labeling associated with MCOOL implementation. Value = 0 before 
April 2005 and thereafter value = 1.  
DQLTY = Difference in quality between quality attributed to the exporting country and 
the perceived average quality. This variable is approximated by the difference of 
average minimum real wage per month across shrimp exporting countries and the 
United States, and country j minimum real wage per month.   Measured in U.S. 5
dollars. (2005=100)  
Costs of producing unprocessed and processed shrimp ( ! ) are not included in 
this empirical model due to unavailability of separate cost data. We also omit variables of 
the conceptual model such as the marginal disutility of substituting shrimp with a differ-
ent degree of processing than desired ( ! ), and proportion of the population who consume 
unprocessed and processed shrimp ( ! ). A separate COOL variable to capture other 
possible effects of MCOOL on the share of unprocessed shrimp is not included in the 
model because of problems of potential multicollinearity between variables COOL and 
TRF.  
!  Wage is a demand-side variable that is used to proxy quality in this equation. Cost of production as a supply-side 5
variable to proxy quality would have been ideal. Due to unavailability of cost of production data, we also estimate 
the equation using producer price index as a proxy for quality. The relevant results are mentioned in the inference 
section.
 Exchange rate can play a decisive role on the share of imported shrimp. For in-
stance in 2007, the U.S. dollar trend affected Thai and Indian shrimp producers. The 
strengthening of the Thai Baht, relatively stronger than increases in other regional com-
petitors’ currencies adversely affected Thai competitiveness. Appreciation of the Real 
(Brazilian currency) in 2007 has resulted in the Brazilian market becoming an attractive 
destination for its own producers in contrast to exports to the United States (www.globe-
fish.org). Exchange rate is measured as local currency per U.S. dollar. A depreciation of 
the local currency (increase in e) will result in an increase in imports of the unprocessed 
shrimp relative to the total quantity of shrimp imports. Equation 4 shows  an increase in e 
will result in U.S. consumers paying a lower price for shrimp. Based on the U.S. In-
ternational Trade Commission’s Interactive Tariff and Trade Dataweb, the unit value of 
imported unprocessed shrimp is greater than processed. So even though both unprocessed 
and processed shrimp face the same change in the exchange rate, an increase in the ex-
change rate decreases the relative price of unprocessed shrimp, which results in a shift in 
the product mix. Thus, shift in the product mix occurs because fluctuations in the ex-
change rate affect the relative demand for unprocessed shrimp.   6
 Anti-dumping duties were imposed on unprocessed shrimp from China, India, 
Thailand, Ecuador, and Vietnam from 2005 to 2008. Other things being equal, anti-dump-
ing duties can result in the exporter netting less money on the transaction than if those 
!  Relative demand for unprocessed shrimp with respect to processed shrimp, and the derivative with respect to the 6
exchange rate is given as: 
  
An increase in exchange rate decreases the relative price of unprocessed shrimp, which results in increase in the 
share of imported unprocessed shrimp.
shrimp were sold in countries with no duties. For example, Brazilian exports of shrimp 
were affected by the tariff increases on sales to the United States, and since 2003 have 
almost disappeared from the U.S. market (www.globefish.org). Thus, imposition of anti-
dumping duties on unprocessed shrimp could also result in a change in the country-mix 
of the shrimp exporting countries. Here we look at anti-dumping duties imposed on un-
processed shrimp alone. We expect an increase in anti-dumping duties on unprocessed 
shrimp for a particular country to result in a decrease in the share of unprocessed shrimp 
from that country, i.e., ! . 
 We consider different transportation charges for processed and unprocessed 
shrimp. Increase in transportation charges for unprocessed shrimp would decrease the 
share of unprocessed shrimp, while increase in transportation charges for processed 
shrimp would increase the share of unprocessed shrimp, i.e., !  and 
! . 
To approximate the shrimp quality of major shrimp exporters, minimum real wage 
per month are used. Because major shrimp exporters are primarily developing countries, 
and shrimp producing farms hire unskilled labor, we consider minimum real wage rates 
as a proxy for quality. An increase in minimum wage rates can be indicative of higher 
quality of shrimp produced because higher wages result in better standard of living. As 
standard of living increases, consumers demand better facilities and infrastructure. This 
leads countries to invest more on the infrastructure and employ higher standards of food 
safety. Most of the shrimp-exporting countries export farm-raised shrimp, which are har-
vested from coastal shrimp farms and farms developed in upland areas. A number of re-
ports (Gale and Buzby, 2009; Acheson, 2007; Barboza, 2007; Lumpkin, 2007; Allshouse 
et. al, 2003, Rahman, 2001) question the quality of shrimp harvested from coastal farms 
of developing countries based on evidences of unapproved drug residues found in farm-
raised shrimp of certain countries. Increase in quality of shrimp may increase the share of 
unprocessed shrimp demanded with MCOOL implementation as origin can be identified 
and consumers can buy shrimp based on the reputation they have developed with respect 
to the origin of shrimp. More discussion on the quality variable and alternative variables 
that can be used to proxy quality can be found in Appendix I. 
The quality variable is characterized as the difference in perceived average and 
individual quality, i.e., ! . Assuming perceived average quality is greater than indi-
vidual quality, increase in individual quality will decrease the difference and vice-versa. 
The expected sign on the share of unprocessed shrimp with increasing difference in quali-
ty in the presence of MCOOL is negative based on ! , i.e., ! . If 
perceived average quality is less than individual quality then the expected sign on the 
share of unprocessed shrimp with increasing difference in quality with MCOOL would be 
positive. 
Data Construction and Sources 
The monthly shrimp import data was obtained from the U.S. International Trade 
Commission’s Interactive Tariff and Trade Dataweb (http://dataweb.usitc.gov/). The im-
ports are classified by Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) number and they are available 
at the 10-digit level. The data source provides the U.S. import records for the seven major 
shrimp exporting countries of interest mentioned earlier in kilograms. The data used is 
aggregated at the 6-digit HTS level. The categories are 030613 (raw, and frozen shrimp), 
030623 (raw, and not frozen shrimp), and 160520 (cooked, and processed shrimp). The 
first two categories represent unprocessed shrimp, while the last category represents pro-
cessed shrimp. More details on this classification are available in Appendix II. For Mexi-
co and Ecuador there are approximately ten months with zero values of processed shrimp 
imports. To construct data we regress a set of values for shrimp imports with time, the 
parametric values are then used to compute fitted values. 
Monthly transportation charges are obtained from the above mentioned USITC 
website under the category ‘import charges’, which represent the aggregate cost of all 
freight, insurance, and other charges (excluding U.S. import duties). These are reported in 
dollars. To find the rate (for example, $1 per kilogram) we divide the charges in dollars 
by kilograms. We follow the same convention in classifying shrimp as unprocessed and 
processed based on HTS numbers mentioned previously. Based on the HTS number clas-
sification we retrieve transportation charges for unprocessed and processed shrimp. 
U.S. anti-dumping duty data was retrieved from a database maintained by Bown 
(2007) and the International Trade Commission website. The anti-dumping duty rates 
vary from 3.58 to 112.81 percent for the countries that were imposed with duties from 
2005 to 2008 (China, India, Ecuador, Thailand, and Vietnam). For more information on 
anti-dumping duties used, refer to Appendix III. 
The monthly real exchange rates (local currency per U.S. dollars) were obtained 
from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics for the coun-
tries considered, with 2005 as the base year. An exchange rate index is constructed by 
setting the value of exchange rate equal to 1 in 2005 across all countries considered.  
The source for nominal minimum wage rate per month in local currency is the 
Global Market Information Database. Real minimum wage per month in U.S. dollars 
was constructed using nominal minimum wage rate per month in local currency, CPI for 
United States (2005=100) and yearly nominal exchange rates. CPI data was obtained 
from ERS International Macroeconomic Data Set and nominal exchange rate was ob-
tained from ERS Agricultural Exchange Rate Data Set. The quality variable defined as 
!  is calculated by the formula ! , where !  is the U.S. real mini-
mum wage per month and !  is the real minimum wage per month of country j. 
Empirical Results 
Let us now define the systematic structure of the econometric model for our data. 
The dependent variable of equation (14) is the share of unprocessed shrimp and takes 
value between zero and one. However, the linear predictors on the right-hand-side can 
take any real value. There is no guarantee that the predicted values will be in the correct 
range unless complex restrictions are imposed on the coefficients. A simple solution to 
this problem is to transform the proportion to remove range restrictions, and model the 
transformation as a linear function of the covariates. This transformation is called logit 
transformation. We do this in two steps: first, we move from the proportion !  to the 
odds defined as the ratio of the proportion to its complement, where ! . 
This is a monotonic transformation, meaning odds increase as the proportion increases 
and odds can take any positive value and therefore have no ceiling restriction. Second, we 
take logarithms, calculating the logit or log-odds, which has the effect of removing the 
floor restriction, where logit ! . Again this is a monotonic transfor-
mation. Thus, logits map proportion !  from the range (0,1) to the entire real line. Sup-
pose that the logit of the underlying proportion !  (Relative share of unprocessed 
shrimp) is a linear function of the predictors, i.e., logit ! , where !  is a vector of 
covariates (exchange rate, anti-dumping duty, freight rates, and interaction of COOL with 
difference in quality) and b is a vector of regression coefficients. This defines the system-
atic structure of the econometric model in equation (14). 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions were run for the seven countries: Chi-
na, Thailand, India, Vietnam, Mexico, Ecuador, and Indonesia and checked for problems 
of multicollinearity. Multicollinearity occurs when there is a linear association between 
two independent variables. This results in high R2 showing that the model fits well, high 
F statistics and deflated t-statistics. Standard errors are inflated and chance of type 2 error 
is high. With the variance inflation factor < 10, and significant t-statistics, we conclude 
that the data does not exhibit multicollinearity. The data is characterized by seven cross-
sections and 132 observations for each cross-section. Tables 1 to 7 contain the sample 
statistics for the variables used for each cross-section. 
Due to the time-series nature of the data, autocorrelation is a concern. First-order 
autocorrelation occurs when the error term in one period is correlated with the error term 
in the previous period, i.e., ! , where !  is a parameter less than one in abso-
lute value and !  is white noise. Autocorrelation results in non-zero off-diagonal ele-
ments of the error variance-covariance matrix. As a result, coefficient estimates are unbi-
ased, but inefficient. In other words, the OLS estimators are no longer the best linear un-
biased estimator with the lowest variance compared to all linear unbiased estimators. 
With positive autocorrelation, a positive (negative) error leads to more positive (negative) 
errors, and the estimated standard errors will be smaller than they truly are, leading to 
high computed t-values and high chances of type 1 error. 
 The Durbin-Watson statistic and the direct estimation of !  suggest problems of 
first-order positive autocorrelation. Autocorrelation is typically corrected by using an es-
timated generalized least squares (EGLS) approach, such as the Cochrane-Orcutt proce-
dure. However, Cochrane-Orcutt method drops the first observation. We correct for this 
problem using the Yule-Walker method of first-order autoregression by transforming each 
independent variable and the intercept by its lagged value. Unlike Cochrane-Orcutt 
method, information from the first observation is retained and used. The model corrected 
for autocorrelation is used for further estimation and analysis. 
The seven countries exporting shrimp are likely to share common characteristics. 
Pooling the information and modeling them as a set of relations to take into account this 
information explicitly, would be apt. The generalized least square estimator for this mod-
el yields the same result as estimating each of the equations individually by OLS. How-
ever, there are omitted factors from individual country equations that explain the depen-
dent variable. These become a part of the unobservable error processes. Similarity in the 
country equations make it natural to assume that the equation errors are correlated. Zell-
ner’s Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) system is ideal to estimate these equations 
that contain correlated equation errors. When the errors are contemporaneously correlated 
across equations, an estimated generalized least squares approach would result in more 
precise estimates of the coefficients compared to OLS estimates. 
Because the generalized least square estimator is the best unbiased estimator for 
our joint estimating model, it is necessarily better than least squares applied separately to 
each equation. By including information on the error covariance using SUR system and 
the estimated generalized least squares estimation rule, we have been able to improve the 
estimated sampling precision with which we can estimate the unknown coefficient vec-
tors. The improvement is relative to individual relations with their corresponding least 
squares estimates of the unknown parameters. The estimation results of autocorrelation-
corrected OLS and SUR estimation are presented in Table 8. 
So far, we have assumed that the coefficient vectors for the seven countries are 
different. Because these countries have many characteristics in common, e.g., they are all 
developing countries exporting to the United States, the relations can be aggregated and 
represented with a common coefficient vector. This would reduce the number of parame-
ters to be estimated and possibly increase the precision with which they are estimated, 
resulting in a restricted model. However, we allow for country differences by imposing 
dummies on the intercepts only and letting the intercepts vary only across countries and 
not over time. The aggregated countries equation would then characterize a time-series 
and cross-sectional model. To estimate the model we use SAS computer program and the 
option TSCSREG (Time Series Cross Section Regression) with PARKS method.   This 7
model assumes a first-order autoregressive error structure with contemporaneous correla-
tion between countries. Table 9 contains estimation results for the restricted model. 
Next we check for the compatibility of unconstrained SUR estimates and con-
strained/restricted estimates, both corrected for autocorrelation and allowing mutual cor-
relation among errors. In other words, we want to check if it makes sense for the coun-
tries to be aggregated, i.e., to check that variables affecting bilateral shrimp trade with 
United States do not exhibit marked differences among countries. Using hypothesis test-
ing procedure at 5 percent critical value, we conclude using the F-test that the use of one 
coefficient vector for seven countries and a separate intercept for each of the seven coun-
tries is valid. The restriction imposed is appropriate and results in unbiased estimators 
with improved sampling precision. 
Inference 
!  The mechanics of Parks method is as follows. Parks method considers the first-order autoregressive model in 7
which the random errors are heteroscedastic, contemporaneously correlated, and autocorrelated. The covariance ma-
trix for the vector of random errors is estimated by a two-stage procedure, and parameter coefficients are then esti-
mated by generalized least squares. The first step in estimating covariance matrix for the vector of random errors 
involve the use of ordinary least squares to estimate parameter coefficients and the fitted residuals are obtained. 
However, instead of obtaining residuals separately for each cross-section, this method aggregates data and obtains 
residuals treating it as one cross-section. To rectify the inaccuracy of not considering cross-sections separately to 
obtain residuals, we introduce dummies on intercepts to preserve the characteristics of residuals corresponding to a 
particular cross-section. The residuals obtained by running ordinary least squares on the model with dummies on 
intercepts, are further used to derive the consistent estimator of the first-order autoregressive parameter. The autore-
gressive characteristic of the data is removed by using the Yule-Walker method of first-order autoregression by 
transforming each independent variable and the intercept by its lagged value. The second step in estimating covari-
ance matrix is to apply ordinary least squares to the transformed model and obtain residuals corrected for autocorre-
lation. Finally, estimated generalized estimators are obtained from the transformed model. This procedure is equiva-
lent to Zellner’s two-stage methodology applied to the transformed model (Zellner 1962). Thus, we use a modified 
Parks method, which accounts for residuals corresponding to each cross-section in the construction of the covariance 
matrix.
 The logit transformation makes the dependent variable a linear function of the in-
dependent variables, i.e., ! . Therefore, the independent variable’s co-
efficient vector b are interpreted as follows. A one-unit increase in the independent vari-
able causes expected change in log odds to be b. To translate the change in log odds to 
the change in odds, we exponentiate change in log odds and b. The percentage increase/
decrease in the odds of exporting unprocessed shrimp to the United States is given as 
! . 
 Based on the restricted model having best linear unbiased estimator and the low-
est variance compared to other linear unbiased estimators, we interpret the coefficient 
vectors in Table 9 as follows: 
 EXC is the real exchange rate index (2005=1). A one-unit increase in exchange 
rate index results in 46.53 percent increase in the odds of exporting unprocessed shrimp 
to the United States compared to processed shrimp. Recall that an increase in the ex-
change rate corresponds to a depreciation of the local currency relative to the U.S. dollar. 
This results in making unprocessed shrimp imports in United States relatively less expen-
sive, for the same change in the exchange rate. Thus, the demand for unprocessed shrimp 
is greater relative to processed shrimp, resulting in an increase in the share of unpro-
cessed shrimp imported to the United States. The coefficient on the exchange rate index 
variable is significant at the 10 percent level of significance.  
TRF represents the anti-dumping duty imposed on five countries out of the seven 
considered. These duties were imposed from 2005 to 2008. A unit increase in anti-dump-
ing duty results in decreasing the share of unprocessed shrimp by 1.6 percent. The an-
tidumping duty variable is significant at the 5 percent level of significance and has the 
expected sign. Anti-dumping duty is levied on unprocessed shrimp; hence an increase in 
duties will directly affect the share of unprocessed shrimp compared with processed 
shrimp. 
FRTu measures the transportation charges related to unprocessed shrimp and FRTp 
indicates transportation charges for processed shrimp. The conceptual model predicts that 
an increase in transportation charges for unprocessed shrimp should decrease the quantity 
of unprocessed shrimp exported relative to the total quantity of shrimp exported. Alterna-
tively, an increase in transportation charges of processed shrimp should increase the share 
of unprocessed shrimp. The coefficient for transportation charges of unprocessed shrimp 
suggests a one-unit increase in costs leads to 14.2 percent increase in the odds of export-
ing unprocessed shrimp. While the coefficient for transportation costs for processed 
shrimp says for a one-unit increase in transportation charges of processed shrimp, we can 
expect  to see about 18 percent increase in the share of unprocessed shrimp exported. 
However, both the variables are not significant at 10 percent level of significance. Based 
on the conceptual model, the expected sign for transportation charges of unprocessed 
shrimp is not preserved, and both variables are not significant to explain unprocessed 
shrimp exports. 
The variable of primary interest is DQLTY. It is the difference in perceived aver-
age quality to individual quality of shrimp for exporting countries considered. Data 
shows that developing countries exporting shrimp to the United States have quality lower 
than the average perceived quality, i.e., ! . Our hypothesis is that as the differ-
ence in this quality increases, the share of unprocessed shrimp should decrease. With 
MCOOL implementation facilitating the disclosure of the origin of unprocessed shrimp, 
we expect a change in the product mix exported to the United States. In other words, 
MCOOL will lead exporting countries to export more processed shrimp. This change will 
be reflected in the decrease in the share of unprocessed shrimp with respect to processed 
shrimp exported. We use interaction term of COOL and DQLTY to characterize the effect 
of change in the difference in quality on the share of unprocessed shrimp with MCOOL. 
With MCOOL implementation, a one-unit increase in the difference in quality leads to a 
0.05 percent decrease in the share of unprocessed shrimp exported to the United States. 
The difference in quality variable is not significant at 10 percent significance level. We 
conclude that implementation of MCOOL does not have a significant effect on the share 
of unprocessed shrimp. 
A variant of equation (14) was estimated, that was specified with no TRF vari-
able. The purpose was to identify the significance of MCOOL implementation in the ab-
sence of anti-dumping duties imposed. Recall that both MCOOL and anti-dumping duties 
were imposed for the same time period. Estimation results show that in the absence of 
anti-dumping duties, a one-unit increase in the difference in quality with MCOOL leads 
to a 0.23 percent decrease in the share of unprocessed shrimp exported to the United 
States. The variable is significant at the 5 percent significance level.  
Another result of interest using equation (14) was to use producer price index 
(PPI) as a proxy for quality instead of real minimum wage per month. Using PPI data, we 
found that ! , which means that for some countries the perceived quality of shrimp 
was greater than the average perceived shrimp quality. Estimation results show that a 
one-unit increase in the difference in quality with MCOOL results in 0.84 percent in-
crease in the share of unprocessed shrimp exported to the United States. The variable is 
significant at the 5 percent level of significance. It is interesting to note that the share of 
unprocessed shrimp increases/ decreases for a unit change in the difference in perceived 
quality depending on !  or ! . 
The intercepts of the model represented by dummies indicate that country differ-
ences are significant and have an impact on the odds of unprocessed shrimp exported to 
the United States.  Dummy coefficients in this model are significantly different from zero 
(except for Thailand). The coefficients can be interpreted as the estimated log odds of ex-
porting unprocessed shrimp to the United States by the particular country. For example, 
DIndia has a parameter estimate of 1.84. The log of odds in this case can be transformed 
back to a probability by: exp(1.84)/(1+exp(1.84)) = 0.86. The interpretation is that the 
share of unprocessed shrimp from India constitutes to 86 percent of its total U.S. shrimp 
export.  
Some factors not accounted in this model are consumer costs of substituting un-
processed with processed shrimp, proportion of consumers with demand for unprocessed 
shrimp relative to processed shrimp, and variables specific to countries like cost of pro-
ducing unprocessed and processed shrimp. 
Lastly these results must be interpreted with caution as some variables used to 
explain change in product mix are proxies for variables that are not measurable. Quality 
is such a variable which is proxied by the use of real minimum wage per month. Omitting 
variables in the regression may lead to omitted bias in estimators. The consequence of 
omitting variables is biased estimators even though sampling variability is smaller than 
the model with no misspecification. 
Conclusion 
With partial MCOOL implementation, i.e., exclusion of processed shrimp from 
labeling, the nature of trade between major shrimp exporters and the United States may 
be redefined. The major shrimp exporters, which account for 93 percent of shrimp con-
sumed in the United States, are developing countries and are known to have difficulty 
meeting developed countries’ quality and safety standards. Moreover, the analysis of 
FDA refusals of imported seafood shipments from 2003 to 2006 revealed that of the im-
ports refused, more than 65 percent were processed seafood products, which are excluded 
from country of origin labeling requirements that the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
oversees (www.foodandwaterwatch.org). Partial MCOOL facilitates disclosure of identity 
or origin and methods of production, which may lead exporters with questionable quality 
to export more processed shrimp relative to unprocessed shrimp. To test this hypothesis, 
we first develop a conceptual model that takes into account consumers’ preference for 
quality via origin and the different varieties of shrimp exported, namely unprocessed and 
processed. The conceptual model shows the share of unprocessed shrimp decreases with 
MCOOL implementation due to quality disclosure and additional costs of compliance on 
firms producing unprocessed shrimp. 
To test the hypothesis empirically we develop an econometric model based on re-
duced-form expressions of the conceptual model. The empirical model considers the ma-
jor shrimp exporters to the United States - China, Thailand, Vietnam, Ecuador, India, 
Mexico, and Indonesia for the time period 1998 to 2008. MCOOL was implemented for 
seafood in April 2005, so the variable of primary interest is consumers’ valuation of 
shrimp quality facilitated by partial MCOOL. We assume that with MCOOL consumers 
would be able to identify the quality of unprocessed shrimp. This partial identification 
could determine the nature of the shrimp product mix exported to the United States. The 
effect of MCOOL on the share of unprocessed shrimp through an interaction variable rep-
resenting MCOOL implementation and relative quality of shrimp has a 0.05 percent ef-
fect on the dependent variable but is not significant. Anti-dumping duties levied simulta-
neously for the same time period as MCOOL has a 1.6 percent effect on the share of un-
processed shrimp. Exchange rate index affects the share of unprocessed shrimp by 46.5 
percent. Anti-dumping duty and exchange rate has a significant impact on the product 
mix exported. These results must be treated with caution as quality is an unobservable 
variable that is proxied with minimum wage per month for the country considered. Using 
PPI as a proxy for quality, changes the results to the interaction variable (COOL and 
DQLTY) being significant and having a 0.84 percent effect on the share of unprocessed 
shrimp. 
 The results of the model suggest partial MCOOL implementation does not affect 
shrimp trade between developing countries and the United States. However, the choice of 
variable as a proxy for quality can reverse the results. This suggests that a better and ac-
curate variable representing quality could be useful in inferring the effect of partial 
MCOOL on U.S. shrimp trade.   
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Figure 1: Schematic Representation of an uncovered U.S. shrimp market 
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Table 1: Statistics for China – U.S. estimation 
0 L
u
unprocessed processed
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
EXC 0.95297 0.05283 0.82731 1.01346
TRF 46.14545 55.67121 0 112.80
FRT 0.25597 0.04273 0.18195 0.46409
!
 !
Table 2: Statistics for Thailand – U.S. estimation 
!
   !
Table 3: Statistics for Vietnam – U.S. estimation 
!
Table 4: Statistics for Ecuador – U.S. estimation 
FRT 0.22939 0.05430 0.0650 0.31635
COOL*DQLTY 36.20227 50.61695 0 114.30
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
EXC 0.97201 0.09828          0.76364      1.29728
TRF 2.42121       2.96805     0 6.40
FRT 0.30173       0.04618      0.20930       0.38980
FRT 0.30206       0.05592      0.18780       0.40040
COOL*DQLTY 20.85455      29.34050          0 69.20
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
EXC 0.97323 0.08460 0.78605 1.07543
TRF 13.10379 20.16890 0 93.10
FRT 0.29275 0.03792 0.16820 0.43090
FRT 0.27219 0.06701      0.16430       0.74580
COOL*DQLTY 54.05909 75.49127          0 162.40
!
!
!
!!
!
Table 5: Statistics for India – U.S. estimation 
!
Table 6: Statistics for Indonesia – U.S. estimation 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
EXC 1.09707 0.21999 0.89966 2.11916
TRF 1.55303       2.00322     0 7.30
FRT 0.28211       0.02866      0.23310       0.38460
FRT 0.22778       0.10555      0.00020   0.7150
COOL*DQLTY 2.07727       3.49601     0 9.40
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
EXC 1.03203 0.08523 0.83064 1.16742
TRF 4.20606       5.19963     0 14.20
FRT 0.37896       0.07819      0.26740       0.63660
FRT 0.36032       0.09904      0.15800       0.82170
COOL*DQLTY 51.23182      71.5420          0 156.20
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
EXC 1.12199 0.31739 0.78283 2.45426
!
Table 7: Statistics for Mexico – U.S. estimation 
!
!!
FRT 0.29916 0.02494      0.23555 0.37838
FRT 0.26756 0.06034      0.16453 0.73423
COOL*DQLTY 42.58409      59.50563          0 131.90
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
EXC 1.00488 0.06852         0.88130 1.24360
FRT 0.14653       0.14616      0.03545       0.80518
FRT 0.19066       0.1850      0.01050       1.05313
COOL*DQLTY 27.48182      38.48769          0 89.40
Table 8: OLS and SUR estimation results for Equation 14 
Variables China Thailand India Ecuador
OLS SUR OLS SUR OLS SUR OLS SUR
INTERCEPT 14.1656
9 
(4.68)
11.856 
(4.09)
2.53898 
(4.05)
2.0002 
(3.38)
1.389211 
(0.83)
1.3848 
(0.85)
0.2989 
(0.22)
0.43642 
(0.33)
EXC -12.325 
(-4.11)
-10.12 
(-3.51)
-0.9106 
(-1.82)
-0.52807 
(-1.12)
0.804 
(0.54)
0.72022 
 (0.50)
0.72448 
(1.08)
0.46748 
(0.72)
TRF -0.0156
2 
(-3.47)
-0.015 
(-3.57)
0.03066 
(1.20)
0.04059 
(1.66)
0.040489 
(1.62)
0.04276 
(1.75)
-0.04166 
(-0.57)
-0.0104 
(-0.15)
FRT -0.2408
6 
(-0.11)
0.348 
(0.17)
-2.3894
6 
(-2.07)
-2.04187 
(-1.89)
-1.23068 
(-1.13)
-0.76914 
(-0.73)
10.2605 
(2.91)
10.7144 
(3.13)
FRT -0.3246
5 
(-0.22)
-0.045 
(-0.03)
-1.9000 
(-2.38)
-1.70983 
(-2.29)
1.008999 
(1.94)
0.80635 
(1.61)
0.23969 
(0.41)
0.32418 
(0.57)
COOL*DQL
TY
-0.0190
8 
(-3.94)
-0.019 
(-4.11)
0.00041 
(0.16)
-0.0005 
(-0.21)
-0.00079 
(-0.37)
-0.00115 
(-0.56)
0.00561 
(0.13)
-0.0197 
(-0.48)
Adjusted R 0.5651 0.7950 0.3867 0.7950 0.8415 0.7950 0.8186 0.7950
Variables Vietnam Mexico Indonesia
OLS SUR OLS SUR OLS SUR
INTERCEPT 2.97178 
(2.09)
3.5407 
(2.60)
1.0868 
(0.37)
0.1441
3 
(0.05)
2.92099 
(4.81)
2.9626
07  
(5.07)
EXC -1.4279 
(-1.23)
-1.7447 
(-1.55)
4.6738 
(1.60)
5.5668
7 (1.98)
0.26108 
(1.26)
0.2298
51 
 (1.15)
TRF -0.0086
9 
(-2.02)
-0.0071 
(-1.71)
FRT -0.3468
2 
(-0.19)
-0.6372 
(-0.37)
0.95429 
(0.72)
1.1900
9 (0.93)
-2.424 
(-1.46)
-2.4796
4 
(-1.56)
FRT -0.0735
9 
(-0.08)
-0.8002 
(-0.92)
-0.450 
(-1.02)
-0.3748
9 
(-0.88)
0.1434 
(0.22)
0.2420
3 
(0.38)
!
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics! !
COOL*DQL
TY
0.00123
6 
(0.89)
0.00127 
(0.94)
-0.00656 
(-0.93)
-0.0069
6 
(-0.99)
-0.00565 
(-4.82)
-0.0060 
(-5.20)
Adjusted R 0.68035 0.7950 0.7656 0.7950 0.9157 0.7950
Table 9: Restricted model estimation results  
!
!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Variable Parameter 
Estimate
Standard 
Error
t value Prob
DThailand 0.033224 0.2888 0.12 0.9084
DIndia 1.840629 0.3282 5.61 <0.0001
DMexico 5.259998 0.3813 13.79 <0.0001
DIndonesia 1.795206 0.3130 5.74 <0.0001
DEcuador 3.5508 0.3608 9.84 <0.0001
DVietnam 1.198732 0.3039 3.95 <0.0001
DChina 1.229279 0.3764 3.27 <0.0001
EXC 0.382035 0.2075 1.84 0.0659
TRF -0.01612 0.00319 -5.05 <.0001
FRT 0.132695 0.5197 0.26 0.7985
FRT 0.165554 0.2283 0.73 0.4685
COOL*DQLTY -0.00057 0.000916 -0.62 0.5367
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APPENDIX I 
DEFINITION OF PRODUCT QUALITY  
Faruq, H. 2006. “New Evidence of Product Quality and Trade” describes at length the 
various proxies used to measure product quality in the literature (pp. 7-9). Relevant por-
tions are reproduced here: 
“Different studies have used different proxies for product quality in trade. Since 
product quality is not directly observed in trade data, most of these proxies are based on 
the assumption that price variations contain sufficient information about quality varia-
tions. Some of these proxies use cross-country variation in export prices (unit values), 
while others rely on both export and import unit prices. Some of these indices are calcu-
lated at the product level, while other indices are constructed at the sectoral level. !
To check for systematic differences in product quality, Rodrik (1994) examines 
the unit values for Taiwan and Korea manufactured exports to the United States. Schott 
(2004) also uses product level unit values to measure quality. In essence, he estimates 
quality by calculating unit values of all U.S. imports (equivalently, exports of all other 
countries) at the product level. The unit values provide substantial variation at a very dis-
aggregate level, and may not be perfect indicators of quality due to underlying product 
heterogeneity and classification error involving inaccurate recording of units and misclas-
sification of goods. Hallak (2005) uses a more aggregate price index to estimate quality. 
More specifically, he uses the Fisher price index, which is the geometric mean of the 
Laspeyres index and the Paasche price index. The Laspeyres index itself weights the 
price in each period by the quantities in the base period, while the Paasche price index 
uses the current period quantities to weight the prices. Hummels and Klenow (2005) also 
use a variant of the Fisher Price Index to infer the quality margin. They decompose each 
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country’s exports to a given market category into its price and quantity components and 
compare them across exporters. !
A number of studies do not construct any specific quality (or price) indices, but 
use other ways to estimate quality differences across countries. For example, Hummels 
and Skiba (2004) estimate quality differences by calculating price variation across all 
country pairs for products in a given category. This removes certain commodity-specific 
variation in prices (e.g. a low quality car might be much more expensive than a high qual-
ity stereo system). They also hold the supply side of the model constant so that price 
variations across importers arise purely due to changes in the quality mix. !
Several studies also explore the horizontal dimensions of product differentiation. 
Instead of equating quality with a price index (under the assumption that all price disper-
sions occur due to vertical quality differentiation), they allow cross-country variation in 
prices to be caused by factors other than quality, such as comparative advantage. For ex-
ample, Hallak and Schott (2005) develop a decomposition methodology that separates 
observed export prices into quality versus quality-adjusted prices. However, despite al-
lowing for horizontal differentiation, they find that for many countries, there is not much 
difference between a country’s quality index and its price index (notable exceptions in-
clude China and Ireland). Khandelwal (2005) also allows for horizontal differentiation by 
applying the discrete choice methodology in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). He in-
fers countries’ unobserved product quality by allowing market shares to influence quality 
estimates, so that products with larger market shares have higher quality (conditional on 
price) and vice-versa. This methodology, while useful at a disaggregate level, is computa-
tionally intensive and difficult to implement at the country level. !
In conclusion, since product quality is not directly observable from trade data, 
there is a lack of consensus on an appropriate measure of quality. Researchers have tradi-
tionally used various price indices to proxy for quality, but this approach ignores the hor-
izontal aspects of product differentiation. On the other hand, efforts to incorporate hori-
zontal differentiation have been relatively scarce and are somewhat difficult to implement 
at a more aggregate level.” !
We use wages to proxy for quality assuming minimum wages as a cost measure is 
indicative of product quality across countries. As an alternative quality proxy, we also use 
producer price index. It measures the average change over time in the selling prices re-
ceived by producers for their output. But this index is aggregated at the country level, so 
it is too generalized, i.e., it makes no distinction with respect to the product category of 
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interest (shrimp). Too much aggregation leads to dangers of comparing different products 
(for example, apples to oranges). Data at a disaggregated level is not available for the 
countries under consideration, so we report results based on minimum real wages as 
proxy for quality. 
!
. !
!
!
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APPENDIX II 
DEFINITION OF UNPROCESSED AND PROCESSED SHRIMP !
 Crucial to the accuracy of this work was to have proper and defined categories 
representing processed and unprocessed shrimp. We define shrimp to be processed/ un-
processed based on the language reported for Country of Origin Labeling law in USDA-
AMS (2004). The regulation defines a “processed food item” as a retail item derived from 
a covered commodity that has undergone specific processing resulting in a change in the 
character of the covered commodity, or that has been combined with at least one other 
covered commodity or other substantive food component (e.g., breading, tomato sauce). 
The addition of a component (such as water, salt, or sugar) that enhances or represents a 
further step in the preparation of the product for consumption, would not in itself result in 
a processed food item. Specific processing that results in a change in the character of the 
covered commodity includes cooking (e.g., frying, broiling, grilling, boiling, steaming, 
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baking, roasting), curing (e.g., salt curing, sugar curing, drying), smoking (cold or hot), 
and restructuring (e.g., emulsifying and extruding). In an effort to make the definition of 
a processed food item clearer in the interim final rule, AMS (USDA) modified the lan-
guage in the proposed rule for fish and shellfish to provide specific examples of the types 
of processing that would result in a product being considered a processed food item. Un-
der the interim final rule, all cooked items (e.g., canned fish, cooked shrimp) and breaded 
products are considered processed food items and are excluded from coverage. 
 The most disaggregated level of data is obtained from the USITC website at the 
10-digit level. We consider three HTS categories: 030613 is broadly defined as raw, un-
peeled/peeled, and frozen shrimp; 030623 is raw, unpeeled/peeled, and not frozen; and 
160520 is cooked, peeled, breaded, and canned. However, at the 10-digit level, descrip-
tion of data in the USITC website also includes ‘cooked by steaming or boiling for the 
030613 and 030623 categories’. Correspondence with personnel in the Census Bureau, 
and FAS (USDA) indicate that the descriptions at the 10-digit level are at best considered 
ambiguous. The suggestions have been to follow the publication of USITC which out-
lines HTS categories by chapters. Chapter 3 relates to unprocessed shrimp and chapter 16 
refers to processed shrimp. Also, tariff classification and country of origin labeling rul-
ings published online (www.faqs.org) clarify classification of shrimp as processed/ un-
processed by the following statements in 2007 NY Rulings - NY N010853: 
“The applicable subheading for the frozen, processed shrimp, when imported in raw, un-
peeled condition (for example, “headless, shell-on”) will be 0306.13.00, Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), which provides for crustaceans, whether 
in shell or not, live, fresh, chilled, frozen, dried, salted or in brine, fit for human con-
sumption: frozen: shrimps and prawns: shell-on, imported in accordance with Statistical 
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Note 1 to chapter 3. The statistical suffix, in the range of “03” to “27”, will depend on the 
count size, as specified in the HTSUS. The rate of duty will be Free.  
 
The applicable subheading for the frozen, processed shrimp, when imported in raw, 
peeled condition (for example, “raw, peeled, tail-on”) will be 0306.13.0040, HTSUS, 
which provides for crustaceans, whether in shell or not, live, fresh, chilled, frozen, dried, 
salted or in brine, fit for human consumption: frozen: shrimps and prawns: peeled, im-
ported in accordance with Statistical Note 1 to chapter 3. The rate of duty will be Free.  
 
The applicable subheading for the frozen, processed shrimp, when imported in cooked, 
peeled condition (for example, “cooked, peeled, deveined”) will be 1605.20.1030, HT-
SUS, which provides for crustaceans, molluscs and other aquatic invertebrates, prepared 
or preserved: shrimps and prawns: other: frozen, imported in accordance with Statistical 
Note 1 to chapter 16: other: other. (Note: If the product is imported in airtight containers, 
the applicable statistical suffix will be “10”, instead of “30”.) The rate of duty will be 
Free.” 
  !!
APPENDIX III 
ANTIDUMPING DUTY IMPOSITION !
Under the antidumping statute, U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) is 
charged with investigating allegations of dumping by foreign producers or importers, 
and, if dumping is found, to counter the effects of such dumping by ordering a duty on 
dumped imports, i.e., an anti-dumping duty. In the course of an investigation, Commerce 
may, at different times, estimate the rate of anti-dumping duty that will ultimately be as-
sessed. The initial estimate follows an affirmative preliminary determination that dump-
ing has occurred. Pursuant to this initial estimate, Commerce instructs the Bureau of Cus-
toms and Border Protection (“Customs”) to collect estimated duties, sometimes referred 
to as “cash deposits,” on entries of the merchandise that is subject to investigation.   After 8
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!  Cash deposit rate is merely an estimate of the eventual liability importers subject to an antidumping duty order will 8
bear. It is an interim or provisional rate.
Commerce completes its investigation, it issues a final determination which may (and 
usually does) adjust Commerce’s initial estimate.  This final determination is implement-
ed in the antidumping duty order. Pursuant to U.S. law, every year after an antidumping 
duty order goes into effect, interested parties have an opportunity to request an adminis-
trative review during the anniversary month of the order. During the administrative re-
view, Commerce determines the amount of antidumping duties to assess on entries that 
were made during the period of review and establishes a new cash-deposit rate on future 
entries for each of the companies reviewed.  So generally the cash deposit rate estab-
lished pursuant to the amended final determinations would remain in effect until the is-
suance of the final results of the first administrative review. The administrative review 
effectively updates the anti-dumping duty order. Once the actual rate of dumping for par-
ticular goods is established through an administrative review, Commerce instructs Cus-
toms to collect the required duties, or refund any monies owed, for the goods imported 
during that period. “Liquidation,” which is the final assessment and collection of duties, 
occurs only once for each entry of goods, and, for the most part, may not be subsequently 
undone.   Thus anti-dumping duty investigations on countries can be classified as prelimi9 -
nary determination, final determination, subsequent reviews, and amended final determi-
nation of less-than-fair-value anti-dumping investigations. 
Further details on the duties imposed and subsequent reviews are archived at 
hhtp://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/index.html. In our model we use cash-deposit rates and liquida-
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!  Because liquidation may not, in most cases, be subsequently undone, it is “suspended” until such time as a party 9
may request an administrative review, and during the pendency of any such review. 
tion rate to capture the structural change on relative share of unprocessed shrimp imports 
for the time period considered. 
!
!
!
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